Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...) Philosophy?" "What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" And again: "Why is it so difficult to substitute anything better?" Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. And in this article, I shall venture to contend that the existence of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think, the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

To the question ‘What is the basis of moral obligation?’, argues that there is no general answer. It is improper to imply that all right acts are right for the same reason. Before defending this view, considers two possible grounds for moral obligation: 1) the goodness of the effects of an action, and 2) the goodness of the act itself. Whereas the former, which is broadly utilitarian, fails to comply with our real moral convictions, the latter does not capture well (...) the role that motive plays in determining the rightness of an action. Moral principles are not deducible either from one single principle or from anything that is not a principle. Each is independent and possesses its own reason as the basis for a given moral obligation. (shrink)

Natural dualities are developed for varieties ofn-valued ukasiewicz algebras with and without negation. These dualities are based on hom-functors, and parallel Stone duality for Boolean algebras. A translation is described which relates the natural dualities to the corresponding restricted Priestley dualities. This enables a unified approach to free algebras to be presented, whence R. Cignoli's characterisations of the finitely generated free algebras are elucidated and new descriptions of arbitrary free algebras obtained. Finally it is shown how dualities for subvarieties encode (...) equational bases. An alternative approach is thereby provided to results of M.E. Adams and R. Cignoli. (shrink)

I have for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.

On Sikh ethics; includes brief biographies of Sikh religious leaders.

What role does the wild duck play in Ibsen's famous drama? I argue that, besides mirroring the fate of the human cast members, the duck is acting as animal subject in a quasi-experiment, conducted in a private setting. Analysed from this perspective, the play allows us to discern the epistemological and ethical dimensions of the new scientific animal practice (systematic observation of animal behaviour under artificial conditions) emerging precesely at that time. Ibsen's play stages the clash between a scientific and (...) a romantic understanding of animals that still constitutes the backdrop of most contemporary debates over animals in research. Whereas the scientific understanding reduces the animal's behaviour, as well as its environment, to discrete and modifiable elements, the romantic view regards animals as being at one with (or violently disconnected from) their natural surroundings. (shrink)

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